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We Need a Fracking Baseline 
INTRODUCTION 
In more than 3,000 locations across Louisiana,1 a pressurized concoction 
of water and select toxic and nontoxic chemicals has been, or will be, injected 
into the earth at up to 100 barrels per minute, with a pressure as high as 15,000 
pounds per square inch (“psi”).2 A mere 10 psi of pressure applied on the 
human body is equivalent to 294 mile-per-hour winds, exerting a force 
sufficient to demolish reinforced concrete buildings.3 The Plutonium bomb 
detonated over Nagasaki created pressures nearing 15 psi at 0.5 miles from 
ground zero and caused total destruction within the radius.4 Pressures nearly 
1,000 times greater than that blast pressure are required to crack rock 
formations lying deep beneath Louisiana’s farms, communities, and cities.5 
Hydraulic fracturing, more commonly referred to as “fracking,” is a 
polarizing subject in politics,6 the environmental debate,7 and the media.8 
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 1. Abraham Lustgarten & Krista Kjellerman Schmidt, State-by-State: 
Underground Injection Wells, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 20, 2012 12:00 PM), http://pro 
jects.propublica.org/graphics/underground-injection-wells [https://perma.cc/M2DP-
FEX4] (select the state of Louisiana).  
 2. See A Look at the Hydraulic Fracturing Process and How it Works, STI 
GROUP, http://setxind.com/upstream/the-hydraulic-fracking-process-and-how-it-
works [https://perma.cc/5CA8-3XWA] (last visited Nov. 8, 2015). 
 3. R. KARL ZIPF, JR. & KENNETH L. CASHDOLLAR, NAT’L INST. FOR 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, EFFECTS OF BLAST PRESSURE ON 
STRUCTURES AND THE HUMAN BODY, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docket/archive 
/pdfs/NIOSH-125/125-ExplosionsandRefugeChambers.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV 
R7-MSHP]. 
 4. Frank von Hippel, The Myths of Edward Teller, BULL. ATOMIC SCI., Mar. 
1983, at 6, 10.  
 5. See infra Part I.B.  
 6. President Barack Obama, Remarks on America’s Energy Security at 
Georgetown University (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/30/remarks-president-americas-energy-security [https://perma.cc/J7A 
N-Q4U5] (“Recent innovations have given us the opportunity to tap large reserves—
perhaps a century’s worth of reserves, a hundred years [sic] worth of reserves—in the 
shale under our feet. But just as is true in terms of us extracting oil from the ground, 
we’ve got to make sure that we’re extracting natural gas safely, without polluting our 
water supply.”). 
 7. GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films 2010). 
 8. Late Show with David Letterman (CBS television broadcast July 18, 
2012) (host claiming that a number of states have been ruined by the “greedy oil 
and gas companies of this country” and the practice of fracking). 
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Although experimental fracking was first used in 1947,9 its use expanded 
significantly during the shale boom of the 2000s.10 Hydraulic fracturing 
involves pumping numerous chemicals diluted by water, including some that 
are toxic,11 into the ground at a pressure high enough to crack deep rock 
formations and increase oil and gas production. The use of fracturing has 
grown exponentially over the past decade;12 accordingly, the number of 
lawsuits claiming contamination by hydraulic fracturing has increased.13 
Often, landowners can prove that oil and gas production chemicals have 
contaminated their water source; given the evidentiary requirements, 
however, they are routinely unable to prove that the fracturing operations 
on the land caused the contamination.14 These landowners are required to 
demonstrate a causal link between the source of the contaminant and the 
                                                                                                             
 9. Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History 
of an Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH., Dec. 2010, at 26, 27 (noting that 
the first successful commercial fracturing treatment was not performed until 1949). 
 10. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-038320, ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2015, at 20 (2015) (“[T]otal dry natural gas production in the United 
States increased by 35% from 2005 to 2013 . . . .”).  
 11. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-15/047a, ASSESSMENT OF THE 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND GAS ON 
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES [Draft] 5-72 (2015). As indicated, this report is a 
draft, and expert commentary during the comment period may alter the contents 
of the original.  
 12. AM. PETROLEUM INST., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: UNLOCKING AMERICA’S 
NATURAL GAS RESOURCES 1 (2014), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy 
/Exploration/HYDRAULIC_FRACTURING_PRIMER.ashx [https://perma.cc/AU2 
A-ZJEJ] (before the shale boom, natural gas production from shale constituted 
roughly 2% of the United States output; by the end of 2015 it will reach 37%, and by 
2035 it is projected to reach 75%); see also MOHSEN BONAKDARPOUR ET AL., IHS 
GLOBAL INSIGHT, INC., THE ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
SHALE GAS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2011), http://anga.us/media/con 
tent/F7D1750E-9C1E-E786-674372E5D5E98A40/files/shale-gas-economic-impact-
dec-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXC4-4F6C].  
 13. See BARCLAY NICHOLSON, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT ANALYSIS OF 
LITIGATION INVOLVING SHALE & HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1 (2014), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/20140101-analysis-of-litigation-involving-
shale-hydraulic-fracturing-104256.pdf [https://perma.cc/959K-7XKG]; see also 
Blake Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing Tort Litigation Summary, UNIV. OF DAYTON 
SCH. OF L., http://www.udayton.edu/directory/law/documents/watson/blake_watson 
_hydraulic_fracturing_primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K5R-4CG9] (last updated July 
23, 2016) (noting that the majority of the 99 contamination cases listed were filed 
within the past five years). 
 14. See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518 (M.D. Pa. 2014); 
Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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actual contamination.15 Unfortunately, both are usually thousands of feet 
or miles beneath the earth’s surface, rendering the procurement of this 
evidence impossible.16 Furthermore, years may pass before the 
contamination actually occurs.17 Consequently, obtaining equitable relief in 
cases in which contamination has already been proven is highly improbable, 
if not impossible.18  
Hydraulic fracturing has not been proven to be inherently dangerous; 
this factor should be considered prior to the implementation of any new 
regulations, as the utility of the practice exceeds its proven risk.19 However, 
until the impact on finite groundwater resources is conclusively determined, 
the acquisition of information and evidence should be improved to develop 
a full record on the subject matter, while simultaneously promoting the 
industry and protecting landowners. The federal government remains 
detached from the issue, as Congress has permitted exemptions for the 
practice in both of the major pieces of legislation intended to regulate the 
industry and protect the nations water, the Clean Water Act and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act.20 The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
conducted a five-year study that resulted in inconclusive outcomes, partially 
because of the lack of a requirement for operators to perform baseline 
testing.21  
Due to the lack of federal guidance and sufficient data acquisition, 
Louisiana must take steps to protect its landowners, drinking water 
resources, and the industries essential to its economy. The first step should 
be requiring hydraulic fracturing operators to perform baseline water testing 
prior to any hydraulic injections. This data will aid injured plaintiffs in 
their pursuit for a factual link to contamination. It will aid the industry by 
possibly providing evidence that fracturing is not the cause of 
contamination. Finally, it will aid the state’s economy by promoting best 
practices and easing public concern. Additionally, once a comprehensive 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Anthony, 284 F.3d 578. 
 16. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 12, at 7.  
 17. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-56–6-57.  
 18. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 19. See infra Part I.C. But see infra Part I.B; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
supra note 11, at 10–20 (finding that contamination has occurred through multiple 
avenues in a relatively small number of cases, but noting that the number of cases 
might be understated because of insufficient pre- and post-fracturing data of the 
groundwater resources).  
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-22 (noting that one of 
the limitations of the reported data was the lack of pre-fracturing local water 
quality data).  
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data set is established, the industry and regulatory agencies will be better 
able to determine when and where contamination is or is not occurring. 
Agencies can then implement or remove regulations to make the process 
safer and more efficient.  
This Comment does not argue that hydraulic fracturing is inherently 
dangerous, nor that its use should be restricted, but instead discusses several 
issues that have arisen from the practice, including the potential for 
increased risk as the shale boom continues. It argues that Louisiana should 
apply a mixed regulatory strategy beginning with requiring baseline water 
testing and promoting best-practices regulations as standards develop or 
when issues arise, which will protect both the industry and the landowners. 
Part I explains hydraulic fracturing and contamination while also 
demonstrating that hydraulic fracturing is essential to Louisiana and the 
United States. Part II discusses the theories of liability available to injured 
landowners and the evidentiary requirements’ prevention of an equitable 
resolution, regardless of whether strict liability is imposed. Part III illustrates 
Congress’s refusal to regulate the industry and demonstrates several states’ 
compensation for this lack of regulation, whereby states enact their own 
regulations. Part IV examines the issues from the perspectives of the 
landowner, the operator, and the State to develop a solution beneficial to all. 
This Comment concludes by proposing that Louisiana should require 
baseline water testing before hydraulic fracturing operations and use the data 
collected over time to establish best-practices regulations for the industry. 
I. THE NECESSITY OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
Hydraulic fracturing has transformed the Louisiana22 and national 
economies over the past decade.23 Since its inception, the industry has also 
improved its own procedures to attain higher production at a lower risk.24 
Although the practice is the subject of much controversy and debate, the 
benefits of cheap energy are indisputable.25 Over the next decade, Louisiana 
expects nearly $100 billion in investments from an industrial renaissance 
largely attributed to low natural gas prices,26 and the nation as a whole 
                                                                                                             
 22. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 23. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 24. In the 1950s, hydraulic fracturing became prevalent over the more 
hazardous nitroglycerin fracturing. The first fracturing fluids were petroleum-
based until the industry moved to the water-based gel fluids in the 1970s. 
Montgomery & Smith, supra note 9, at 27–28. 
 25. See infra Part I.C. 
 26. LOREN C. SCOTT & JAMES A. RICHARDSON, THE LOUISIANA ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK: 2015 AND 2016, at iii (2014) (In 2014, “Louisiana [was] in the midst 
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stands to gain if the production of shale energy sources27 remains safe and 
efficient.  
A. Understanding Hydraulic Fracturing and its Development 
Hydraulic fracturing is a method for stimulating underground rock 
formations to increase oil and gas production.28 It is commonly used in 
conjunction with horizontal drilling to maximize formation stimulation 
and overall production of oil and gas.29 The wellbore can penetrate the 
earth a mile or more vertically before gradually turning horizontal and 
continuing for up to an additional 6,000 feet.30 Once the desired terminal 
location is reached and the well is prepared, fracking fluid, called “mud,” 
is injected into the well at a pressure that exceeds the breakdown pressure 
of the formation.31 The high-pressure fluid causes the formation to crack, 
creating a fracture that generally runs vertically in both directions through 
the formation.32 The operator pumps the fluid into the fracture, expanding 
the crack until it is wide enough to accept the chosen propping agent, or 
“proppant.”33 Operators then add propping agents such as sand or ceramic 
beads34 to the fluid after the fracture is formed to fill the fracture, thereby 
“propping open” the fracture and permitting the flow of oil or gas to the 
well.35 The final step is to pump the fracking fluid back to the surface, 
                                                                                                             
of an industrial boom unlike any other in our history, with over $100 billion in 
industrial projects either under construction or at the front-end engineering and 
design phase.”); id. at 104 (projecting Louisiana to have more than 2 million non-
farm employees for the first time in history in 2015).  
 27. Shale energy is natural gas and oil produced from a fine-grained sedimentary 
rock known as shale. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have made the 
production of shale energy much more efficient. See Shale 101: An Overview of Shale 
Energy, INST. FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY, http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default 
/files/shale_101.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6DW-TVFL] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). 
 28. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-1.  
 29. Id.  
 30. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 12, at 7.  
 31. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF 
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, at App. A-1 (2004) (fracturing 
fluid may also be referred to as “pad”).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.; see Montgomery & Smith, supra note 9, at 28. 
 34. Id. at App. A-13.  
 35. Id. 
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where it is collected; the proppant is left behind to hold the crack open.36 
The amount of fracking fluid left in the well is termed “leakoff”; the 
amount of leakoff depends on the formation being fractured.37 In some 
formations, 90% or more of the fracturing fluid might be left in the well.38 
The fracking fluid injected into the well is designed with a specific 
chemical composition to serve a particular function.39 The fluids often 
vary by company, location, and well.40 The primary functions of the fluid 
are to create and expand the fracture, transport the proppant to the fracture, 
and abandon the proppant in the fracture, thus propping the fracture 
open.41 The fear of groundwater contamination is due in large part to the 
chemical additives necessary to perform these tasks. On average, roughly 
1.5 million gallons of water are used in the hydraulic fracturing of each 
well,42 with some formations requiring up to 15 million gallons.43 
Chemical additives typically constitute 2% or less of the mixture.44 The 
EPA estimates the total volume of chemicals injected into each well ranges 
from 2,600 gallons to 18,000 gallons.45 More information has been 
introduced in recent years regarding the chemical composition of the 
fracking chemicals through voluntary and mandatory disclosures.46 
                                                                                                             
 36. Joe Schremmer, Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against Strict 
Liability for Hydraulic Fracturing, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1215, 1220 (2012). 
 37. The amount of fluid remaining in the well is determined by the amount 
of fluid injected into the well, the reservoir’s hydraulic properties, the capillary 
pressure near the fracture faces, and the length of time between the well being 
shut in and production. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-35.  
 38. Id. Other studies have shown 85% or more fracturing fluid remaining in 
some Marcellus Shale wells. Additionally, a study of 271 wells in West Virginia 
revealed that more than 85% of the total volume of fracturing fluid remained in 
more than 80 of the Marcellus Shale wells. Id. at 7-9.  
 39. For example, acids are added to dissolve cement, minerals, and clays; 
biocides control or eliminate bacteria; and corrosion inhibitor protects the iron 
and steel components of the well. Id. at 5-10–5-11. 
 40. Id. at ES-12.  
 41. Id. at ES-10.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Jean-Philippe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas 
Production in Texas, U.S., 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3580, 3582 (2012) (Haynesville 
Shale averages 5.7 million gallons per well and Eagle-Ford averages 4.3 million 
gallons per well). 
 44. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-10. 
 45. Id. at ES-12. 
 46. About Us, FRACFOCUS, http://www.fracfocus.org [https://perma.cc/67 
4W-RG4B] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). Fracfocus is an online registry that 
2016] COMMENT 551 
 
 
 
However, the majority of companies refuse to disclose any proprietary or 
trade-secret additives when not required by state law.47 No federal 
regulation regarding the disclosure of fracturing chemicals currently 
exists; consequently, the states’ requirements vary significantly.48 Some 
of the variance in state requirements may be attributed to the type of 
chemicals required for the state’s specific geologic conditions and which 
avenue for contamination is most likely.49 
The current method of hydraulic fracturing traces its roots to the 19th 
century practice of “shooting” the well.50 Originally, the fracturing 
operator dropped liquid or solidified nitroglycerine into the well and 
detonated it to fragment the oil-bearing formation and increase the flow of 
oil to the well.51 Operators attempted different fracturing methods over the 
years before a viable hydraulic fracturing commercial application was 
performed in 1949.52 This original method involved pumping crude oil 
mixed with gasoline and sand into the formation.53 In the first year, 
operators treated 332 wells, with an average increase in well production of 
75%.54 The use of hydraulic fracturing continued to increase with an 
estimated 25,000 to 30,000 wells fractured annually in the U.S. between 
2011 and 2014.55 Overall, an estimated two million wells have been 
                                                                                                             
collects data from mandatory disclosures and allows operators to voluntarily 
disclose the chemical composition of their hydraulic fracturing treatments.  
 47. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 48. Wyoming requires companies to make disclosures of the contents of the 
fluid to the state, and the information is made public after any proprietary 
information is redacted. Arkansas does not require the chemical composition to 
be disclosed, but it does require the additives to be categorized by type. See Jeffrey 
C. King, Factual Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic Fracture – 
Groundwater Contamination Litigation, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 341, 
358–59 (2012). 
 49. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 16,183 (proposed Mar. 26, 2015) (codified at BLM Onshore Oil and Gas 
Operations, 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2016)) (deciding against a national requirement for 
baseline testing partially because local authorities are better informed of their 
specific geologic conditions). 
 50. Montgomery & Smith, supra note 9, at 27.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-5.  
552 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
hydraulically fractured over the past 60 years.56 With 95% of new wells 
requiring hydraulic fracturing to reach their designed production potential,57 
the industry’s growth is expected to continue.58 
B. Sources of Hydraulic Fracturing Contamination 
Although fracturing chemicals are intended to serve a specific purpose 
in the production of oil and gas, debate continues over the possibility of 
the chemicals migrating into drinking water resources.59 Currently, barring 
a local ordinance prohibiting the activity, the practice of hydraulic 
fracturing is permitted to occur near residences60 and drinking water 
resources.61 In 2013, approximately 6,800 public drinking water sources 
serving more than 8.6 million Americans had at least one hydraulically 
fractured well located a mile or less from the source.62 The three primary 
sources of concern over drinking water contamination are due to accidents 
or spills occurring at the surface, migration of the fluid from the production 
zone through the formation into drinking water resources, and movement 
of fluid out of the production well because of deficiencies in the well 
casing.63 
The first source of contamination is a surface spill, which can occur 
during the shipment of materials to the fracturing site, during operations 
at the drill site, or even after the fluid is collected as produced water or 
                                                                                                             
 56. Natural Gas from Shale: Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/how_is_shale_gas_produced.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/8SWM-BMSD] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016).  
 57. Id. 
 58. See 3 IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE: THE 
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE US ECONOMY 47 (2013), 
http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/Americas_New_Energy_Future_Phase3 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QJ4-PL8C]. The value added for the entire unconventional 
energy-value chain and energy-related chemicals is expected to increase to $533 
billion in 2025, from $284 billion in 2012. Id. Jobs that the shale gas industry created 
are expected to increase from 600,000 in 2012 to over 1.6 million by 2035. Id. at v. 
 59. See GASLAND, supra note 7; Late Show, supra note 8 (host claiming that 
the “greedy oil and gas companies of this country” and the practice of fracking 
have ruined a number of states).  
 60. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-5–ES-6 (noting that 
between 2000 and 2013 approximately 9.4 million Americans resided a mile or 
less from a hydraulically fractured well). 
 61. Id. at 3-11.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at ES-13–ES-14.  
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flowback.64 The fluid collected at the well site is collectively referred to as 
“produced water” and includes the fracturing fluid and any water extracted 
from the formation.65 Wells in close proximity have shown a higher incident 
rate of “well communication events” that lead to surface spills caused by well-
component failures.66 These well communications occur when either the 
wellbore or fractures of the well being hydraulically fractured intersect the 
wellbore or fractures of a nearby well, permitting the pressurized fluid of the 
first well to invade the second well.67 If the second well is properly sealed and 
abandoned, the invasion should not occur or cause problems.68 However, 
many older wells were not designed to contain the high pressures associated 
with hydraulic fracturing.69 In the EPA’s study of 225 surface spills of 
produced water, the average volume of released fluid in each spill was 990 
gallons, with 8% of the studied spills reaching surface or groundwater.70  
The second source of contamination occurs through the migration of gas 
or chemicals from the production zone through the rock formation into 
groundwater.71 This migration likely occurs during either the pressurized 
fracturing or through natural fluid activities over years or even decades.72 
Impermeable formations and formations significantly deeper than the 
groundwater are much less likely to permit this sort of migration because more 
obstacles lie between the contamination source and the groundwater.73 
Several formations such as the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia and the Haynesville Shale in Louisiana and Texas lie very deep and 
might have a mile or more between the top of the formation and the base of 
the groundwater.74 However, an EPA study of 23,000 wells concluded that 
20% of the wells had fewer than 2,000 feet between the shallowest point of 
fracturing and the base of the groundwater resource.75  
The third source of contamination involves migration within the wellbore 
through the casing of the wellbore being fractured or through a nearby well 
experiencing well communication.76 The well casing is a steel pipe that 
                                                                                                             
 64. See id. at ES-17, 7-30. 
 65. Id. at ES-16. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 6-42–6-45. 
 68. Id. at 6-45. 
 69. Id. at 6-51–6-52. 
 70. Id. at ES-17, ES-19.  
 71. Id. at 6-48. 
 72. Id. at 6-56–6-57. 
 73. Id. at ES-15.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at ES-14. 
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encircles the well, provides support, and prevents fluid migration.77 The 
surface casing typically extends from the wellhead through any groundwater 
zones and is commonly encircled by cement.78 Many older wells were 
constructed with insufficient casing and were not designed for the high-
pressure injections associated with hydraulic fracturing;79 these wells are 
commonly reopened and hydraulically fractured. These wells may also be 
infiltrated with pressurized fracturing fluid through well communication with 
nearby wells being hydraulically fractured.80 Additionally, even modern wells 
that were designed for hydraulic fracturing are susceptible to design or 
construction imperfections81 and prove to be a source of contamination.82 
C. The Beneficial Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing 
Despite the risk associated with the practice, hydraulic fracturing is a vital 
element of the United States’s energy and economic portfolios. The shale 
boom provides a tremendous source of economic benefit for not only the 
hydraulic fracturing operators, but also for the government and the average 
American household. In 2012, unconventional oil and gas operations were 
estimated to contribute $1,200 in real disposable income to each household in 
America.83 The conventional oil and gas value chain and energy-related 
chemical sector are expected to provide 2.9 million U.S. jobs in 2015.84 
Americans benefit directly from hydraulic fracturing through increased 
employment opportunities and decreased energy costs, and indirectly through 
manufacturers’ ability to produce chemicals and products more profitably 
because of access to cheaper energy.  
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. at 6-4. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at ES-15 (estimating that 6% of the 23,000 wells studied were drilled 
ten years before being hydraulically fractured and suggesting that these wells may 
not have been designed to withstand the stresses associated with hydraulic 
fracturing). 
 80. Many wells were improperly plugged in the 1950s by using little to no 
cement. Id. at ES-16.  
 81. Id. at ES-14 (estimating that 3% of the 23,000 wells studied between 2009 
and 2010 did not have cement across a portion of the casing within groundwater 
depths). 
 82. Id. at ES-14–ES-15 (arguing that natural gas was able to migrate into 
Bainbridge, Ohio drinking water resources because of inadequately cemented casing). 
 83. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 58, at 55 (stating that by 2025 this 
number is expected to reach more than $3,500). 
 84. Id. at 42 (stating that by 2025 the sector is projected to provide 3.9 million 
US jobs). 
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1. Industrial Economic Impact 
Many manufacturing industries of raw goods, such as bulk chemicals and 
primary metals, are expanding and converting to the use of dry natural gas and 
gas plant liquids (“NGPL”) feedstocks instead of petroleum-based feedstocks 
because of the economic benefits.85 Natural gas has initiated a “manufacturing 
renaissance” in Louisiana that will be responsible for $100 billion in planned 
project investments over the next several years.86 These manufacturers use 
natural gas “like a baker uses flour”; it is their “daily bread.”87 Nationally, the 
value added in 2012 for the entire unconventional energy-value chain and 
energy-related chain was more than $284 billion and is projected to reach 
$533 billion by 2025.88 These increases will lead to increased government 
revenues, from more than $74 billion in 2012 to a projected $138 billion in 
2025, with a total collection of more than $1.6 trillion over this time period.89 
2. Energy Independence 
Hydraulic fracturing is instrumental in the United States’s mission to 
become energy independent. Although the first attempt at the initiative under 
the Nixon administration failed,90 the United States has resurrected this ideal 
because of technological improvements making previously inaccessible oil 
and gas accessible91 and the ability to avoid the risk and uncertainties 
                                                                                                             
 85. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at ES-1. 
 86. SCOTT & RICHARDSON, supra note 26, at iii (noting in 2014 that 
“Louisiana is in the midst of an industrial boom unlike any other in our history, 
with over $100 billion in industrial projects either under construction or at the 
front-end engineering and design phase”); id. at 104 (projecting Louisiana to have 
more than 2 million non-farm employees for the first time in history in 2015). 
 87. The Benefits of Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Oversight Field 
Hearing before the Subcomm. On Energy and Mineral Resources, 109th Cong. 
66 (2006) (statement of Dan Borne, President, Louisiana Chemical Association). 
 88. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, supra note 58, at 47. 
 89. Id. at 50. 
 90. Project Independence: Hearing Before the House Comm. of the Interior & 
Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 1 (1975); see generally DOE Timeline: 1971-1980, DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, http://web.archive.org/web/20060927141408/ http://www.mbe.doe.gov 
/me70/history/1971-1980.htm [https://perma.cc/YFC7-27E9] (last visited Oct. 14, 
2016). 
 91. See Joseph S. Nye, Shale Gas is America’s Geopolitical Trump Card, 
WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2014, 6:26 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/joseph-nye-
shale-gas-is-americas-geopolitical-trump-card-1402266357 [https://perma.cc/A3C 
L-7NXF] (“The U.S. was regarded as increasingly dependent on energy imports and 
was building terminals to import high-priced liquefied natural gas. Instead, North 
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associated with foreign producers.92 Since the inception of the shale boom, 
the United States has steadily reduced its dependency on foreign energy 
resources.93 By 2017, the United States is projected to be a net exporter of 
natural gas,94 and by 2028, the United States is projected to be energy 
neutral.95 
3. Transition from Fossil Fuels to Renewables  
Using natural gas to produce energy has played a tremendous role in the 
United States’s effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.96 As an energy 
producer, natural gas is considered a clean fuel alternative when compared to 
other viable alternatives.97 On average, natural gas-fired power plants in the 
                                                                                                             
America is now building terminals to export its low-cost LNG, and the continent is 
expected to be self-sufficient in energy in the 2020s, according to a broad consensus 
of energy experts. The Energy Department estimates that the country has 25 trillion 
cubic meters of technically recoverable resources of shale gas, which when 
combined with other oil-and-gas resources could last for two centuries.”); Bob 
Abeshouse, American Power And The Fracking Boom, HUSSEINI ENERGY (Oct. 2, 
2014), http://www.husseinienergy.com/media-center/in-the-press/american-power-
and-the-fracking-boom/ [https://perma.cc/E3BD-26U4] (“After decades of fuel 
dependency on the Middle East and elsewhere, fracking—the high pressure 
extraction of oil and gas from shale—promises to make the United States energy 
self-sufficient by 2030.”). 
 92. Tom Gjelten, Energy Independence For U.S.? Try Energy Security, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2012, 4:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10 
/25/163573768/energy-independence-for-u-s-try-energy-security [https://perma 
.cc/WZK5-AR98] (discussing the importance of “energy security” to prevent 
events similar to the oil boycott that several Arab countries imposed on the U.S. 
in 1973). 
 93. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 17 (2015) (arguing that net 
imports of energy have declined from 30% of total consumption in 2005 to 13% 
in 2013 because of strong growth in domestic oil and gas production from tight 
formations). 
 94. Id. at ES-1 (projecting natural gas exports to continue growth after 2017 
with projected net natural gas exports ranging from 3.0 trillion cubic feet (“tcf”) 
and 13.1 tcf in 2040). 
 95. See id. at ES-3. A country that is energy neutral has equal amounts of 
energy imports and exports. 
 96. Mike Orcutt, How and Why U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Are Falling, 
MIT TECH. REV. (May 6, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/527106 
/how-and-why-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-are-falling/ [https://perma.cc/EP4J-N7 
RC].  
 97. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATURAL GAS: AIR EMISSIONS, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905095003/http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/ener
2016] COMMENT 557 
 
 
 
United States emit half the carbon dioxide, less than a third of the nitrogen 
oxides, and about 1% of the sulfur oxides that their coal-powered counterparts 
emit for the same quantity of energy production.98 In 2013, the U.S. energy 
sector emissions reached their lowest level since 1994.99 Cheap natural gas 
prices and the industry’s willingness to convert to a cheaper and cleaner fuel 
largely attributed to this reduction.100 In 2013, total emissions in the United 
States were only 4.7% higher than they were in 1994, while total emissions in 
2007 were 17.5% above the 1994 levels.101 This reduction correlates with an 
increase in coal prices and a significant decrease in the price of natural gas 
in 2009.102 In April 2012, energy production from natural gas reached the 
same level as coal for the first time in recorded history.103 As methods to 
increase energy production from renewable resources, such as water, 
wind, and solar sources, are made more efficient, natural gas is a clean 
“transition fuel” that might bridge the gap between coal and renewables.104 
Renewable electricity generation is expected to increase 72% by 2040;105 
moreover, between 2025 and 2040, projections show that natural gas will 
                                                                                                             
gy-and-you/affect/natural-gas.html#footnotes [https://perma.cc/SVW7-XDFY] (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 98. Id. 
 99. CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LEVERAGING NATURAL GAS 
TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, at v (2013), https://www.c2es.org/docUp 
loads/leveraging-natural-gas-reduce-ghg-emissions-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/R 
ZK5-GHQX].  
 100. See Orcutt, supra note 96. 
 101. Id.  
 102. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TRENDS IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 2–3 
(2014), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-
Inventory-2014-Chapter-2-Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/M556-MVEN] (stating 
that other factors include the economic downturn and less energy-intensive weather 
conditions).  
 103. Monthly Coal-and Natural Gas-Fired Generation Equal for First Time in 
April 2012, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (July 6, 2012), http://www.eia.gov 
/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6990 [https://perma.cc/B9DM-LTGD].  
 104. Interview with Gina McCarthy, Administrator, US Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
in Washington D.C. (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint 
/Documents/Events/RFF-Sept25-GinaMcCarthyPLF.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GY 
L-N2DD] (“Let me start off by saying that natural gas in the US has been a game 
changer. The abundance of low-cost natural gas has really started an energy 
transition that we are really taking advantage of and hoping to follow through our 
111(d) process, so it’s been a significant benefit to the United States. It’s been a 
significant benefit to air quality, because it’s allowed us some room to address 
pollution, pollutants like mercury in a way that maintains reliability because it’s 
accessible and it’s affordable.”). 
 105. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at ES-6. 
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be the fuel source for 60% of all new electricity generation, with renewable 
fuels supplementing the remaining generation.106 Consequently, energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions are projected to remain below 2007 
levels through 2040.107 
Natural gas benefits the average citizen both directly and indirectly 
and has become an essential part of the American economy. As the 
industry transitions from fossil fuels to renewable resources, cheap natural 
gas provides a cleaner energy source than coal and leads to more jobs in 
the U.S. because of increased manufacturing. Natural gas as an industry 
has grown exponentially in the past decade with the increased use of 
hydraulic fracturing, and the projected benefits of increased natural gas 
production are inconceivable without the continued use of hydraulic 
fracturing.108 
II. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LITIGATION 
Natural gas is and will likely continue to be a valuable asset to the 
current U.S. economy. However, because of the industry’s rapid growth, 
it is unclear whether the technology and increased use of hydraulic 
fracturing will outpace the regulatory framework that keeps other similar 
industries in check.109 Some argue that the solution to the lapse in 
regulation is imposing strict liability to encourage companies engaged in 
hydraulic fracturing to apply the highest standards of safety and alleviate 
some of the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs injured by groundwater 
contamination.110 However, imposing strict liability will still leave injured 
parties without a means of equitable relief because the most difficult 
burden, that of proving causation, remains.  
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. at 24. 
 107. Id. at 27 (“The main factors influencing CO2 emissions include substitution 
of natural gas for coal in electricity generation, increases in the use of renewable 
energy, improvements in vehicle fuel economy, and increases in the efficiencies of 
appliances and industrial processes.”); see id. at 26 fig.36. 
 108. Natural Gas from Shale, supra note 56. 
 109. See Jason T. Gerken, Comment, What the Frack Shale We Do? A 
Proposed Environmental Regulatory Scheme for Hydraulic Fracturing, 41 CAP. 
U.L. REV. 81 (2013); Alexander T. Maur, Note, Let’s Not Frack This Up: State-
based Solutions for the Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing and the Disposal of 
Flowback Water, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 151 (2015). 
 110. See Hannah Coman, Note, Balancing the Need for Clean Energy and 
Clean Water: The Case for Applying Strict Liability in Hydraulic Fracturing 
Suits, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 131, 15459 (2012). 
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The most common claims brought in hydraulic fracturing suits are 
trespass, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability for ultra-hazardous 
activities.111 Causation is an essential element to each of these theories of 
liability112 and is often the element that plaintiffs are incapable of proving. 
To survive a motion for directed verdict, plaintiffs must provide sufficient 
evidence that hydraulic fracturing activities caused the contamination of 
the groundwater,113 in addition to the other elements that the specific 
theory of liability being pursued requires.114  
A. Alleging Contamination 
Given the circumstances of the hydraulic fracturing process and the 
numerous potential sources of contamination, proving causation in 
groundwater contamination cases places a nearly insurmountable burden 
on plaintiffs. Although groundwater contamination does not occur in a 
widespread or systemic manner,115 it has occurred.116 As natural gas 
becomes the primary source of energy in the United States,117 the use of 
hydraulic fracturing will continue to increase at an expansive rate. Expanded 
use of the activity consequently escalates the likelihood of increased 
occurrences of contamination, whether due to operator error or an 
unforeseeable circumstance. 
The standard of evidence required to prove groundwater contamination 
is nearly impossible to reach because baseline water composition data is 
lacking,118 the source of the contamination is located miles beneath the 
surface,119 and the contamination might take years to infiltrate the 
groundwater.120 In cases in which groundwater pollution in fracking areas is 
                                                                                                             
 111. See, e.g., King, supra note 48, at 344, n.17 (citing multiple sources). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 345 n.21; Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 
518 (M.D. Pa. 2014).  
 113. Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 114. King, supra note 48, at 346. 
 115. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-6.  
 116. See id. at 10-20. 
 117. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10, at 27. 
 118. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11. 
 119. AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 12, at 7. 
 120. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-56–6-57. (“Given the 
surge in the number of modern high-pressure hydraulic fracturing operations 
dating from the early 2000s, evidence of any fracturing-related fluid migration 
affecting a drinking water resource (as well as the information necessary to 
connect specific well operation practices to a drinking water impact) could take 
years to discover.”); Gerken, supra note 109, at 99 (proposing that an “enhanced 
regulatory framework could give a landowner the tools to make a case in state 
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confirmed, but insufficient evidence exists to establish the required factual 
link between the fracturing and water contamination, common law remedies 
are incapable of providing equitable relief for injured plaintiffs.121  
B. Liability for Negligence 
In jurisdictions that do not recognize strict liability tort actions for 
abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activities, plaintiffs often turn to 
alternative theories such as negligence.122 The burden of proving causation 
remains a barrier for plaintiffs, however, because of the inability to obtain 
evidence of the defendant’s breach of duty and evidence establishing that 
breach caused the injury. The following elements are those most 
commonly required for a finding of liability stemming from negligence: 
first, the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; second, 
the defendant’s breach of that duty; third, that the breach caused the injury; 
and fourth, that the plaintiff suffered injury because of the breach.123 
In Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., the Anthony family brought claims 
for the negligent contamination of groundwater and soil on the family 
ranch caused by the hydraulic fracturing of two separate wells.124 The 
family had baseline water test data from 1973 to 1975 showing that the 
water chloride level was roughly 60 parts per million (“ppm”), a suitable 
level for human consumption, but by 1988, the level had increased and far 
exceeded a level safe for human consumption.125 The family claimed the 
contamination was due to hydraulic fracturing operations that Chevron 
performed from 1979 to 1989 to increase production.126 To succeed, the 
plaintiffs had to prove the four elements of negligence liability, and 
predictably, the plaintiffs had difficulty proving causation.  
To meet the evidentiary burden of causation, the plaintiffs provided 
the testimony of two expert witnesses.127 Through one expert’s testimony, 
the plaintiffs established that one of the Chevron wells was leaking 
                                                                                                             
court in the distant future, if not create alternative causes of action to be brought 
immediately in federal court under existing environmental statutes”). 
 121. Gerken, supra note 109. 
 122. See King, supra note 48, at 344. The terms “abnormally dangerous” and 
“ultra-hazardous” are used interchangeably in this Comment. 
 123. Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Mosley v. Excel Corp., 109 F.3d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 124. Id. at 582. 
 125. Id. at 581 (explaining that the chloride level reached 980 ppm by 1988).  
 126. Id. at 582. 
 127. Id. at 584. 
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through the casing in multiple areas.128 Additionally, the expert established 
that Chevron had initiated a fracture that extended vertically from the 
production zone and theorized that the continued use of high-pressure 
saltwater injections over several years had caused the fracture to continue 
upward, which caused contamination of the groundwater aquifer.129 
Although the plaintiffs established the water was contaminated and 
proposed several fact-based theories for how Chevron could have caused 
the contamination, the court determined that the experts had not 
established a sufficient factual link between Chevron’s operations and the 
contamination of the groundwater.130  
The court offered advice for bridging this evidentiary gap in stating, 
“[t]he well could have presumably been tested or a separate well could 
have been dug in the vicinity of these point sources to search for higher 
pollution.”131 These recommendations would have imposed additional 
costs on the plaintiffs, aside from the cost of the two experts who were 
already hired. Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiffs failed to 
address the possibility that other subsequent operators caused the 
contamination, implying an additional burden of requiring a plaintiff to 
prove not only that the defendant contaminated the groundwater, but also 
that other operators did not contaminate it.132  
The evidence presented in Anthony was more extensive than that 
submitted by most plaintiffs in similar suits because the plaintiffs in 
Anthony were able to prove that contamination occurred with baseline 
water data as well as factually plausible sources of fluid migration from 
the defendant’s fracturing wells.133 However, the evidence was insufficient 
to establish the factual nexus between the contaminant source and the 
contaminated water.134 This scenario demonstrates the significant burden 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. at 584–86 (relying on the temperature log, which revealed that the well 
was leaking through numerous holes in its casing from 2,016 feet to 1,924 feet, and 
at 1,390 feet below the surface, roughly 1,300 feet below the contaminated aquifer). 
 129. Id. at 586–87 (establishing that Chevron initiated a fracture that extended 
vertically from the production zone 166 feet towards the aquifer and theorizing 
that Chevron’s continued use of high-pressure saltwater injections over several 
years after the initial fracture had caused the fracture to continue upward, thus 
causing contamination of the aquifer, which was roughly 1,500 feet above). 
 130. The experts provided proof that the fracturing fluids had ventured farther 
than Chevron might have intended, but the plaintiff could not factually prove that 
the fluid had migrated an additional 1,300 to 1,500 feet to the groundwater and 
caused the contamination. Id. 
 131. Id. at 586. 
 132. Id. at 587. 
 133. Id. at 586–87. 
 134. Id. at 590. 
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injured plaintiffs face when bringing contamination suits under a negligence 
theory. 
C. Strict Liability 
The elements required to find that hydraulic fracturing is an ultra-
hazardous activity subject to strict liability vary among the states. The cause 
of action is intended to impose liability for actions that are abnormally 
dangerous regardless of whether the utmost care is exercised during the 
operation.135 The activity is continued because the utility derived from the 
activity justifies the risk of proceeding.136 The essential question is not 
whether the defendant acted negligently, but rather whether the activity itself 
presents an abnormal degree of risk that cannot be alleviated by operating with 
the utmost care.137 Some argue that strict liability is the best means to permit 
equitable relief to plaintiffs injured by hydraulic fracturing activities.138 
Pennsylvania has adopted the analysis set forth in The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 519 and section 520 for determining whether an 
activity is abnormally dangerous.139 Section 519 states that “[o]ne who carries 
on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm . . . of 
another resulting from the activity, although he exercised the utmost care to 
prevent the harm.”140 To determine whether the activity is “abnormally 
dangerous,” section 520 enumerates a six-factor test. These factors are as 
follows: first, the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, 
land, or chattels of others; second, the likelihood that the resulting harm will 
be great; third, the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable 
care; fourth, the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
fifth, the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; 
and sixth, the extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes.141 Pennsylvania plaintiffs have not yet been able to 
present the required evidence to establish hydraulic fracturing and other 
                                                                                                             
 135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 136. Id. § 520 cmt. b. 
 137. See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518, 529 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 138. Coman, supra note 110, at 15459. 
 139. See, e.g., Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 529 (adopting §§ 519 and 520 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts); Diffenderfer v. Staner, 722 A.2d 1103, 1107 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998) (same); Melso v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 576 A.2d 999, 1002–03 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990) (same); Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1219–20 (1995) 
(same); Albig v. Municipal Auth. of Westmoreland Cnty., 502 A.2d 658, 662–63 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same).  
 140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 141. Id. § 520. 
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similar injection activities142 as abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous 
activities.143 These plaintiffs generally revert to other theories of liability such 
as negligence, which make recovery more difficult because of the additional 
case-specific evidentiary burdens.144 
Arkansas has developed a simplified two-part test to determine whether 
an activity is ultra-hazardous. If the gas production activity “necessarily 
involves a risk of serious harm . . . which cannot be eliminated by the exercise 
of the utmost care and is not a matter of common usage,” the activity is ultra-
hazardous.145 Arkansas courts have implemented a standard similar to 
Pennsylvania’s by permitting a full record to be established and withholding 
judgment until discovery is complete.146 In contrast, Texas does not recognize 
a cause of action of strict liability for “abnormally dangerous” or “ultra-
hazardous” activities for oil and gas operations.147 Instead, Texas plaintiffs 
generally bring negligence claims,148 in which the evidentiary showing is 
more cumbersome. 
                                                                                                             
 142. See Melso, 576 A.2d at 1003 (finding that operating a pipeline in an urban 
area was not abnormally dangerous); Smith, 665 A.2d at 1220 (finding that 
underground gasoline storage tanks are not ultra-hazardous or abnormally 
dangerous because they are common, can be dealt with safely, and are valuable to 
society); Diffenderfer, 722 A.2d at 1107 (holding that the storage of toxic 
insecticide in a barn was not abnormally dangerous). 
 143. See Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d 518.  
 144. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993) 
In order to prevail on a cause of action in negligence under Pennsylvania 
law, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty or obligation recognized by the 
law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) 
a failure to conform to the standard required; (3) a causal connection 
between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or 
damage resulting to the interests of another. 
(citing WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971)). These 
other claims are more burdensome for plaintiffs because they have to prove the 
injuring party’s actions fall below the required standard of duty, which is not 
required for strict liability claims. 
 145. Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 571 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Ark. 1978) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 146. Tucker v. Sw. Energy Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20697, *10 (E.D. Ark. 
Feb. 17, 2012) (first citing Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 
506, 511–12 (M.D. Pa. 2010); and then citing Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 
763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011)). 
 147. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 226 (Tex. 1936) (declining 
to apply a strict liability standard in oil and gas operations); Harris v. Devon Energy 
Prod. Co., No. 4:10-CV-708, 2012 WL 220212 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2012), aff’d as 
modified 500 Fed. App’x. 267 (5th Cir. 2012).  
 148. See Harris, 2012 WL 220212. 
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Prior to 1996, article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code imposed absolute 
liability for damage that the proprietor of an estate caused on his neighbor’s 
property by ultra-hazardous activities.149 In 1996, however, the legislature 
amended article 667 and limited its application to pile driving and blasting 
activities.150 Before the amendment, Louisiana required four elements to be 
met to impose strict liability related to an ultra-hazardous activity: first, the 
activity had to be related to the immovable; second, the activity itself must 
have caused the injury; third, the defendant must have directly engaged in the 
activity; and fourth, the activity must have had the ability to cause injury, 
regardless of a party’s substandard conduct.151 Numerous methods have been 
used to determine the standard for “substandard conduct” that the third 
element requires,152 but substandard conduct is generally deemed to require 
the activity to be capable of causing injury “even when conducted with the 
greatest prudence and care.”153 Although Louisiana does not currently 
recognize a cause of action for hydraulic fracturing as an ultra-hazardous 
activity, modifying article 667 to permit these claims would not alleviate the 
burden of causation. 
The theories of liability currently available to injured plaintiffs do not 
promote equitable relief for groundwater contaminations that have already 
occurred. Both legislators154 and scholars155 have debated whether hydraulic 
fracturing should be considered an ultra-hazardous activity and, consequently, 
                                                                                                             
 149. See Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 211 So. 2d 627 (La. 1968) (pile 
driving); Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80 So. 2d 845 (La. 1955) 
(blasting); Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 293 (La. 1957) (herbicide crop dusting); 
Updike v. Browning-Farris, 808 F. Supp. 538, 542–43 (W.D. La. 1992) (storing 
hazardous waste); Hampton v. Rubicon Chems., Inc., 458 So. 2d 1260, 1268 (La. 
1984); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971) (storage of 
poisonous gas). 
 150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 667 (1996); see also Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish 
Gov't., 907 So. 2d 37 (La. 2005) (affirming the amended code article). 
 151. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 126768 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 152. Updike, 808 F. Supp. at 542–43 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 
to permit a factual inquiry based on a fully developed record, but also noting that 
if the ultra-hazardous determination can be based on an analogy to other cases, 
the court would conclude that the storage of hazardous waste in pits is an ultra-
hazardous activity). 
 153. Triplette v. Exxon Corp., 554 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
 154. Timothy Wheeler, Lawmakers Wade Into Debate Over Fracking in 
Western Maryland, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com 
/features/green/blog/bal-lawmakers-wade-into-debate-over-fracking-in-western- 
maryland-20150303-story.html [https://perma.cc/3DGM-CQF9].  
 155. See generally Coman, supra note 110; King, supra note 48; Schremmer, 
supra note 36. 
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subject to strict liability. Regardless of whether strict liability or negligence 
liability applies, the primary evidentiary burden of causation remains the 
same. Plaintiffs lack the information to prove the factual link required by 
courts to prove the defendant caused the contamination;156 thus, taken in the 
aggregate, this same lack of a factual link over time prevents a finding that 
hydraulic fracturing is an abnormally dangerous activity.157 And, regardless 
of whether hydraulic fracturing is considered abnormally dangerous, the risk 
factor will not weigh heavily against the overall utility of the activity until 
sufficient evidence from multiple contamination claims provides a factual link 
between hydraulic fracturing and groundwater contamination. 
Ultimately, the lack of causation evidence in contamination cases has two 
possible explanations: either hydraulic fracturing does not cause groundwater 
contamination, or it occasionally does cause contamination but the practice is 
not sufficiently studied and monitored to establish a record of the 
contamination. An EPA study158 and several plaintiffs159 have established that 
oil and gas activities have contaminated groundwater resources, which proves 
the latter scenario more plausible. In instances where equitable relief is not 
available to injured parties through ex post160 tort liability, a robust ex ante161 
regulatory strategy might be necessary to reduce the occurrence of harm by 
establishing safe standards and best practices.  
III. CURRENT REGULATIONS 
A number of reasons exist as to why the controversy over the long-
term detrimental effects of hydraulic fracturing has reached considerable 
proportions. Clean water is a finite resource, in some locations more than 
others, that is usually found underground.162 Pumping large quantities of 
                                                                                                             
 156. King, supra note 48, at 344. 
 157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(requiring the “existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land 
or chattels of others”). 
 158. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-57. 
 159. See, e.g., Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 160. Ex post regulation, such as tort liability, imposes monetary damages on 
injuring parties after the injury has occurred. See Thomas Merrill & David 
Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water 
Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 212 (2013). 
 161. Ex ante regulations attempt to reduce the risk of injury before their 
occurrence by imposing industry standards and requirements. Id. at 215. 
 162. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/601/R-12/004, SAFE AND 
SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES: STRATEGIC RESEARCH ACTION PLAN 2012–
2016, at 7 (2012). 
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pressurized blends of toxic chemicals into the ground over several years 
will likely have a detrimental effect. However, as long as industries with 
similar risks, such as nuclear power plants and chemical manufacturing 
plants, are regulated to alleviate the risk involved, the general public is 
more likely to accept this risk.163 When activities perceived to impose a 
high risk of harm are left largely unregulated, such as hydraulic fracturing, 
the talking points align and the ensuing controversy leads to a largely 
misinformed debate.  
A. Federal Regulations 
Hydraulic fracturing and other oil and gas activities are exempted from 
several of the major federal environmental regulations that similar 
industries are required to follow, which removes any reassurances of 
regulatory oversight from the public opinion. The Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) is intended to maintain and restore the biological integrity of 
surface water by preventing pollution sources in navigable waterways.164 
The objective of the CWA is to protect surface water as opposed to 
groundwater, both of which are currently being used as sources of drinking 
water.165 Contamination of surface waters by hydraulic fracturing 
activities, however, would not activate the CWA regulations because of 
several exemptions. The operators of oil and gas exploration and 
production facilities are not required to obtain CWA permits for the storm-
water runoff from these facilities, which effectively exempts these 
activities.166 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded this exemption to 
exempt pollution caused by activities necessary for the preparation of the 
site and for movement and placement of the drilling equipment at these 
facilities.167 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) required all “underground 
injection” activities to obtain a permit and be regulated by an approved 
Underground Injection Control (“UIC”) program before 2005.168 UIC 
programs required the applicant to show that the underground injection 
would not endanger drinking water and required inspection, monitoring, 
                                                                                                             
 163. Ayesha Rascoe, Fracking Regulations Could Ease Public Concerns: White 
House, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011, 3:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
natgas-fracking-regulation-idUSTRE73P6DV20110426 [https://perma.cc/CSE9-
QURE].  
 164. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 165. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at ES-3.  
 166. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2). 
 167. Id. § 1362(24). 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b) (2012).  
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and recordkeeping of the well activities.169 Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s 
ruling that hydraulic fracturing “fit[s] squarely” within the defined class 
of “underground injections,”170 Congress exempted hydraulic fracturing 
from the SDWA171 in a controversial act colloquially known as the 
“Halliburton Loophole.”172 This exemption was controversial because 
many viewed it as an endorsement of oil and gas companies’ continued 
operations, even though the effects of hydraulic fracturing could not be 
conclusively stated.173  
Additionally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) exempts oil and natural gas 
from the definition of “hazardous waste.”174 The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act subsection C regulates the disposal of hazardous waste 
products but, similar to CERCLA, contains a provision exempting “drilling 
fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, 
development, or production of crude oil or natural gas.”175 The Clean Air 
Act (“CAA”) grants direct control to the EPA over areas satisfying the 
“major source” criteria.176 When sources of air pollution like drilling and 
pumping equipment are within a contiguous area, such as a fracking site, the 
pollution of all sources are aggregated to establish the total pollution 
aggregate for the area.177 If the total pollution aggregate surpasses the CAA 
                                                                                                             
 169. Id.  
 170. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. (LEAF), Inc. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253, 
1263 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit rejected the EPA’s interpretation that 
“underground injection” did not include hydraulic fracturing activities. The 
EPA’s interpretation included only wells “whose ‘principal function’ is the 
underground emplacement of fluids,” and hydraulic fracturing would be excluded 
because its primary function is the production of product. Id. at 1471. 
 171. The exemption was part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and is not 
applicable when the fracturing fluid contains diesel. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii).  
 172. See The Halliburton Loophole, EARTHWORKS, http://www.earthworks 
action.org/issues/detail/inadequate_regulation_of_hydraulic_fracturing#.VRMaZC
lN3zI [https://perma.cc/6KBW-UPF9] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). The 1997 LEAF 
decision happened while the EPA was under the Clinton Administration and the 
“Halliburton Loophole” occurred during a Republican majority in Congress. This 
distinction supports the notion that the lack of federal regulation is largely based on 
economic concerns and not on partisan issues. 
 173. Adam Garmezy, Balancing Hydraulic Fracturing's Environmental and 
Economic Impacts: The Need for a Comprehensive Federal Baseline and the 
Provision of Local Rights, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 405, 407–10 (2013). 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 175. Id. § 6921(b)(2)(A). 
 176. Id. § 7412(a)(1). 
 177. Id. 
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threshold, the EPA will issue regulations to achieve the maximum 
reduction of these emissions.178 However, the statute later declares that 
emissions from “any oil or gas exploration or production well . . . [are not] 
aggregated for any purpose under this section.”179 It was not until April of 
2012 that the EPA finally issued the first federal air standards for 
qualifying hydraulically fractured wells.180  
Presumably awaiting further study and information from the EPA, 
Congress has allowed the expiration of several bills intended to modify 
these federal regulations.181 The draft of the five-year study was finally 
released in June 2015. However, the inconclusive statements in the report, 
citing a lack of pre- and post-fracturing data,182 only further the notion that 
Congress and the EPA lack the same contamination evidence as plaintiffs, 
which has proven detrimental to plaintiffs’ claims. These exemptions 
show that the federal government is either unable or unwilling to enforce 
the same regulatory standards on hydraulic fracturing operations as it 
imposes on other similar industries. Consequently, the regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing is largely left to the states.  
B. State Regulations 
A comprehensive federal regulatory strategy would be cumbersome 
and largely impractical given that the practice of hydraulic fracturing can 
vary significantly by rock formation and other regional conditions. States 
are in a better position to develop regulatory strategies because of their 
knowledge of their respective geologies and other local concerns.183 Many 
state regulatory agencies, however, are already understaffed for purposes 
of handling the increased workload that the shale boom caused and would 
likely find it difficult to propose and implement new regulations governing 
                                                                                                             
 178. Id. § 7412(d)(2)(A). 
 179. 42 U.S.C § 7412(n)(4)(A). 
 180. 40 C.F.R. § 60.5375 (2012). 
 181. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (“FRAC”) Act of 
2011, H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011); Fracturing Regulations Are Effective in 
State Hands (FRESH) Act, S. 2248, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 182. The report found that contamination has occurred through multiple 
avenues in a relatively small number of cases, but notes that the number of cases 
might be understated because of insufficient pre- and post-fracturing data of the 
groundwater resources. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 10-20.  
 183. Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective State 
Regulation, Groundwater, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 
49, May 2010, at 1, 31, https://www.law.ou.edu/sites/default/files/files/FACULTY 
/2010okjoltrev49.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2X-CGV6].  
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hydraulic fracturing that require heavy oversight.184 If hydraulic fracturing 
continues in its projected growth pattern, regulations requiring oversight 
at any level will likely be impractical without the allocation of significant 
additional resources. Any proposed regulations should provide a benefit 
that the cost of enforcing the regulations balances to prevent the stifling of 
the industry or overburdening of regulatory agencies.  
1. Baseline Water Testing 
Various states have implemented different forms of regulation on the 
hydraulic fracturing industry. Baseline water testing alleviates the states’ 
regulatory strain by imposing the burden of testing and monitoring on the 
companies engaging in the potentially hazardous activity. Several states 
require baseline water testing of the water resources within a certain radius 
of the well.185 Baseline water testing provides valuable information to state 
regulators, fracking operators, and injured plaintiffs. The testing 
establishes a record of the chemical composition of the water before 
hydraulic fracturing occurred in the area.186 This baseline composition can 
then be compared to new water tests to determine if and when 
contamination has occurred.187 If contamination has occurred, the data 
                                                                                                             
 184. See Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL'Y F. 361, 371 (2012) (“Some state agencies tasked with executing 
environmental regulations - often in addition to ensuring oil and gas conservation 
and protecting mineral rights - have been overwhelmed by the pace and volume 
of new well development.”). In Texas, the number of wells drilled increased by 
75% from 2003 to 2008 while the regulatory staff increased by only 4% over the 
same time period. With over 273,000 wells in Texas in 2009, the administrative 
burden of additional regulations would be tremendous. How Big is the Gas 
Drilling Regulatory Staff in Your State?, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica  
.org/gas-drilling-regulatory-staffing/states/TX.html [https://perma.cc/LFQ6-8E6 
9] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). In Louisiana, the number of new wells drilled 
annually increased by 42% between 2003 and 2009, while the regulatory staff 
increased by only 3%. Id.  
 185. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1509.06(A)(8)(c) (West 2016) (requiring 
testing of water sources within 1,500 feet of the well); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
113–423(f) (West 2016) (requiring the testing of water sources within 5,000 feet 
of the well).  
 186. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing and the Baseline Testing of 
Groundwater, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 857, 870 (2014). 
 187. Id. at 871.  
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might also be used in conjunction with fracking fluid chemical 
compositions to determine which operator caused the contamination.188  
Some operators in states without mandatory testing perform the 
baseline testing on a voluntary basis.189 Presumably, operators performing 
voluntary testing do so as part of their well monitoring and information 
gathering, as well as to create an evidentiary record showing that they have 
not caused contamination.190 Several states, such as Colorado, Illinois, 
North Carolina, Ohio, and Wyoming, require mandatory baseline water 
testing before the fracturing of wells.191 These requirements typically vary 
by the number of water sources that must be tested, the anticipated impact 
radius, and the population density of the drilling area.192 The radius of 
water sources that must be tested varies significantly, from 1,500 feet in 
Ohio to 5,000 feet in North Carolina, with the variation presumably based 
on the various states’ tailoring of their regulations to fit unique geologic 
formations and other conditions.193  
Illinois requires baseline water testing before hydraulic fracturing and 
places a particularly onerous presumption of liability against the operator. 
The presumption is applied if pollution of a water source occurs within 
1,500 feet of the well site and is shown to have occurred within 30 months 
of the hydraulic fracturing operation.194 Rebutting this presumption 
requires the operator to affirmatively prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the water source was not within 1,500 feet of the well site, 
that the pollution did not occur during the 30-month window, or to prove 
another cause of the contamination.195 This form of presumption places the 
operator in the same position as plaintiffs in other states because the 
operator lacks the evidence to prove a factual link between the source of 
                                                                                                             
 188. For an in depth discussion of baseline groundwater testing see id. at 887–
89.  
 189. See id. at 874; see Voluntary Baseline Water Sampling Guideline, N.M. 
OIL & GAS ASSOC., http://www.nmoga.org/voluntary-baseline-water-sampling-
guideline [https://perma.cc/2MCY-7L7Y] (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
 190. See Hall, supra note 186, at 874.  
 191. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404–1:609(b) (2016); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732 
732/1–80(b) (2016).; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 113–423(f) (West 2016); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. 1509.06(A)(8)(b)–(c) (2016); 055-003 WYO. CODE R., § 46(a) 
(LexisNexis 2016). 
 192. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732/1-80(b). 
 193. Cf. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 
Fed. Reg. 16,183 (proposed Mar. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160) 
(deciding against a national requirement for baseline testing partially because 
local authorities are better informed of their specific geologic conditions). 
 194. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732/1-85(b). 
 195. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732/1-85(c). 
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the contaminant and the actual contamination. These presumptions might 
incentivize safe practices by operators to an extent, but they will likely 
stifle the industry for fear of liability for contaminations caused by third 
parties.196  
Other states, such as Pennsylvania and West Virginia, do not require 
operators to perform baseline testing, but encourage the exercise by 
establishing evidentiary presumptions against operators who decline to do 
so. Pennsylvania establishes a presumption of liability against operators of 
unconventional wells where water contamination occurs within 2,500 feet 
of the wellbore and the pollution occurs within 12 months of completion, 
drilling, stimulation, or alteration.197 This presumption is rebuttable, 
however, with pre-drilling baseline water data proving that the 
contamination existed before drilling or that the landowner refused testing.198 
Incentivizing the performance of baseline testing alleviates some of the 
issues related to contamination litigation by improving a plaintiff’s chances of 
proving at least a portion of the factual nexus required. It also provides 
evidence that can protect defendant operators when their particular operations 
are not the cause of the alleged contamination. Despite the perceived benefits 
associated with requiring baseline water testing before hydraulic fracturing, 
including enhanced data acquisition and safer production, Louisiana does not 
require any form of baseline water testing.199  
2. Chemical Disclosures 
In a recent study on the impact of hydraulic fracturing on groundwater 
resources, the EPA identified more than 1,000 chemicals—including 
acids, alcohols, aromatic hydrocarbons, bases, hydrocarbon mixtures, 
polysaccharides, and surfactants—used in various quantities in hydraulic 
                                                                                                             
 196. North Carolina has a similar rebuttable presumption. The presumption is 
rebuttable, however, with a more lenient standard of preponderance of the 
evidence. To rebut the presumption, the evidence must show that the water supply 
is not within a half mile of the well, the contamination occurred prior to the 
fracturing, a separate cause for the contamination existed, or that the owner 
refused the baseline water testing. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 113–421(a1) (West 
2016). The statute also requires that operators causing contamination must 
provide to the users of the water supply a replacement water supply that is 
adequate in quality and quantity for their use, in addition to any other damages. 
Id.. § 113–421(a5).  
 197. 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(c) (West 2016). West 
Virginia has similar statutes to encourage baseline testing, but they require a 
reduced radius of 1,500 feet. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6A-18 (West 2016). 
 198. 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(d)(2). 
 199. See infra Part V.B.1 for detailed discussion. 
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fracturing operations.200 Prior to 2010, operators did not have to disclose 
the chemicals contained in their fracturing fluid in any state.201 Currently, 
the majority of states permitting hydraulic fracturing activities have some 
form of disclosure requirements.202 Many states permit the disclosure to 
Fracfocus, an easily accessible online registry of fracturing fluid compositions 
being used in wells across the country.203 
Full-disclosure states, such as Arkansas204 and Texas,205 require that all 
chemicals added to the fracturing fluid be disclosed by type and concentration, 
including specific names of each additive, to the director.206 Once disclosed 
to the director, the operator may apply to have any trade-secret portion 
withheld from the subsequent public disclosure.207 The director of the 
regulating agency must keep the qualifying trade-secret chemicals 
confidential.208 Because trade-secret chemicals might hold tremendous 
value, some states might prefer a partial-disclosure strategy because of 
liability concerns associated with holding the full-disclosure trade-secret 
chemicals confidential.  
Several states, such as Michigan209 and Louisiana,210 have a partial-
disclosure requirement for chemicals used during hydraulic fracturing. In 
partial-disclosure states, the operator is required to disclose all of the 
chemicals added to the fracturing fluid unless the chemicals are protected 
as trade secrets.211 If the chemicals are trade secrets, the operator may 
choose to disclose the chemical family of the trade-secret chemical 
                                                                                                             
 200. The ten most common chemicals are methanol, hydrotreated light petroleum 
distillates, hydrochloric acid, isopropanol, ethylene glycol, peroxydisulfuric acid 
diammonium salt, sodium hydroxide, guar gum, glutaraldehyde, and propargyl 
alcohol. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 5-72. 
 201. Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory 
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 406 (2013). 
Noting that Wyoming became the first state to require fracturing fluid chemical 
disclosures in 2010.  
 202. Fracfocus.org contains a database of the disclosure regulations of each 
state. FRACFOCUS, supra note 46.  
 203. Id. (allows operators to disclose the chemical composition of their 
hydraulic fracturing treatments either voluntarily or mandatorily). 
 204. 178.00.1-B-19 ARK. CODE R. § (l)–(m) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 205. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2) (2016). 
 206. Id. § 3.29(c)(2)(A). The “director” in Texas is the director of the Oil and 
Gas Division of the Railroad Commission of Texas. Id. § 3.29(a)(13). 
 207. Id. § 3.29(c)(2)(C). 
 208. Id. § 3.29(e). 
 209. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1406 (2016). 
 210. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, §118(C)(1)(b) (2016). 
 211. Id. §118(C)(2)(a) (2016); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1406(2). 
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instead.212 The non-trade-secret chemicals are first disclosed to the state 
and then to the public.213  
The trend of states requiring public disclosure is helpful in establishing 
public reassurance that the industry is being regulated and monitored. 
Landowners and concerned citizens alike are able to access this data and 
personally inspect the chemicals being injected near them, and operator 
employees can determine what types of chemicals are on their jobsite.214 
Additionally, the disclosed chemicals may be compared to baseline water 
tests in states requiring them to determine which operator might be the 
most likely source of contamination.215 Operators can also compare their 
fluid compositions with other companies and adjust them to better suit the 
specific rock formation or location. 
3. Fracturing Bans 
In contrast, some jurisdictions have outright bans on hydraulic 
fracturing, such as the country of France216 and several states, including 
Vermont,217 Maryland,218 and New York.219 Such bans should be 
                                                                                                             
 212. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, §118(C)(2)(a)(i); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 
324.1406(2). 
 213. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, § 118(C)(f)(5). 
 214. FRACFOCUS, supra note 46.  
 215. See generally Hall, supra note 186, at 870.  
 216. Tara Patel, France Vote Outlaws ‘Fracking’ Shale for Natural Gas and Oil 
Extraction, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2011, 5:22 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2011-07-01/france-vote-outlaws-fracking-shale-for-natural-gas-oil-extrac 
tion [https://perma.cc/ZCZ6-7BM5]. 
 217. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 571(a) (West 2016); Vermont First State to Ban 
Fracking, CNN (May 17, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/17 
/us/vermont-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/AK9K-U7G8]. Because Vermont does not 
have any proven natural gas resources, however, the law has been compared to 
banning offshore drilling in Oklahoma. A Fracking Fixation in Vermont, 
OKLAHOMAN (May 19, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/3676611 
[https://perma.cc/B9AB-ELQE]. 
 218. Josh Hicks, Md. Fracking Moratorium to Become Law without Hogan’s 
Signature, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
politics/md-fracking-moratorium-to-become-law-without-hogans-signature/2015/05 
/29/e1d10434-062c-11e5-a428-c984eb077d4e_story.html [https://perma.cc/PE6Z-
HDRR] (The Maryland law is a two year moratorium on additional fracturing that 
expires in October 2017.). 
 219. Freeman Klopott, N.Y. Officially Bans Fracking with Release of Seven-Year 
Study, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2015-06-29/n-y-officially-bans-fracking-with-release-of-seven-year-study 
[https://perma.cc/P8PR-2SB4]. 
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considered only in areas where the specific geologic formations, along 
with other conditions, do not lend themselves to the safe practice of 
hydraulic fracturing. Because hydraulic fracturing is a necessity to the 
current and future economy,220 solutions that increase innovation and the 
safety of the practice should be preferred over outright bans.  
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Proving negligence in Louisiana requires the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that the conduct in question was a cause in fact of the resulting harm, the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, the duty was breached, and the risk 
and harm caused were within the scope of the duty breached.221 The 
evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to succeed in a negligence claim is 
nearly impossible to overcome in contamination cases,222 with causation 
being the most difficult element to prove.223 However, proving that the 
defendant was negligent and actually breached a duty is often just as 
difficult for plaintiffs in contamination cases involving hydraulic 
fracturing. 
A. Burden on the Claimant 
In most cases, if contamination occurs, the fracturing fluid’s migration 
through the subsurface formations to reach the groundwater would likely 
take years.224 Any changes in mineral lease ownership during that time 
would further complicate the plaintiff’s evidentiary requirements. Over 
several decades, the operator of a specific well or unit portion might 
change several times, and operators may begin fracturing operations on 
nearby lands as well, thus increasing the number of companies that might 
                                                                                                             
 220. See supra Part I. 
 221. See Mart v. Hill, 505 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (La. 1987); Hill v. Lundin & 
Associates, Inc., 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972); see also Timothy J. McNamara, The 
Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk Analysis, 44 LA. L. REV. 1227 (1984); David 
W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. 
Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973). 
 222. See supra Part II.A.  
 223. King, supra note 48, at 346; Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 
578, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 224. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 6-56–6-57. (“Given the 
surge in the number of modern high-pressure hydraulic fracturing operations 
dating from the early 2000s, evidence of any fracturing-related fluid migration 
affecting a drinking water resource (as well as the information necessary to 
connect specific well operation practices to a drinking water impact) could take 
years to discover.”). 
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have caused the injury. Under a negligence theory, the plaintiff would have 
to prove which company caused the contamination by establishing a factual 
nexus between that company’s operations and the contamination.225 
Consequently, the plaintiff might have to prove that other companies’ 
operations did not cause the contamination.226 
In states that permit claims based on ultra-hazardous activities and 
impose strict liability, some of the evidentiary burdens for ordinary 
negligence claims are lifted.227 Negligence imposes liability on actors for 
harm that their failure to exercise reasonable care causes.228 Under a strict-
liability theory, the defendant is liable for harms that the activity in 
question causes.229 The plaintiff does not bear the burden of proving that 
the defendant’s actions were negligent or careless, which has proven 
difficult in contamination cases.230 This burden might be replaced, 
however, with burdens requiring the plaintiff to prove that the activity 
itself satisfies the ultra-hazardous factors.231 The primary inquiry 
established by the six-factor test232 is  
whether the nature of the activity and the potential dangers 
associated with it, given the particular location, are so great that 
despite the usefulness it may have for the community, it should be 
required as a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes without 
the need of a finding of negligence.233  
All factors should be considered, but no requirement that all factors be 
present exists.234 Ordinarily, a finding that several factors are satisfied is 
required for a finding of strict liability.235 The burden of establishing 
                                                                                                             
 225. Anthony, 284 F.3d at 590. 
 226. Id. at 587. 
 227. See Alan O. Sykes, Strict Liability versus Negligence in Indiana Harbor, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1918–19 (2007).  
 228. Id. at 1918.  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1918–19. 
 231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see 
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1255–56 (5th Cir. 1985) (listing the factors 
in Louisiana for determining whether an activity is ultra-hazardous prior to the 
1996 amendment). 
 232. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see 
also Nathan R. Hoffman, The Feasibility of Applying Strict-Liability Principles to 
Carbon Capture and Storage, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 527, 541–42, n.144 (2010). 
 234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 235. Id. at cmt. f. 
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evidence that tips the balance of the factors in favor of a finding that hydraulic 
fracturing is an ultra-hazardous activity has proven arduous in recent 
decisions.236 For example, in Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., the plaintiffs 
established that their water supply had been contaminated but were unable to 
provide substantial evidence to support their claim that hydraulic fracturing 
constituted an ultra-hazardous activity.237 Additionally, they could not 
establish that the drilling company’s operations caused the contamination.238  
B. Lack of Evidence 
The overarching problem in the case law, public opinion, and 
regulations is a lack of evidence and information. Plaintiffs have been able 
to prove that their water supplies are contaminated on several occasions;239 
however, they have not been able to provide evidence proving that 
hydraulic fracturing caused the contamination.240 Furthermore, permitting 
claims to be brought under an ultra-hazardous activity theory might further 
equitable relief in some cases, but generally these claims will still suffer 
from a lack of causation evidence.241 The lack of evidence infiltrates the 
case law under the ultra-hazardous analysis in two ways. First, the plaintiff 
generally lacks the evidence to establish the factual link between the 
source of the hydraulic fluid and the contamination of the groundwater.242 
Second, this same lack of evidence in the aggregate weighs against a 
finding that hydraulic fracturing is ultra-hazardous—the factors will weigh 
against a finding of the activity being ultra-hazardous if the risk of the 
activity has not been sufficiently established.243 The risk of hydraulic 
fracturing cannot be sufficiently established without the acquisition of data 
over many years, as the EPA study evidences.244 
                                                                                                             
 236. See Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 518, 534 (M.D. Pa. 
2014); Berish v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 763 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (M.D. Pa. 2011). 
 237. Ely, 38 F. Supp. at 523. 
 238. Id. (plaintiff offered expert witness testimony that the fluid contaminant 
likely migrated from the wells into the water supply). 
 239. Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578, 581–82 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 523. 
 240. Anthony, 284 F.3d at 586–87; Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 523. 
 241. See King, supra note 48, at 344. 
 242. See, e.g., Anthony, 284 F.3d at 590; see also King, supra note 48, at 346. 
 243. Ely, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 529 (citing Smith v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215, 1219 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that “whether an activity presents a high degree of 
risk should not focus on whether the Defendants acted negligently, but instead 
should remain focused on whether the activity itself is abnormally dangerous”). 
 244. See supra Part III.A. 
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C. Regulation 
The same lack of information has affected the implementation of 
federal regulations as well. In 2011, Congress proposed the Fracturing 
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (“FRAC”) Act.245 The FRAC 
Act would amend the SDWA by repealing the fracking exemption, or 
“Halliburton Loophole,” and requiring hydraulic fracturing operators to 
disclose the chemicals used in their fracturing fluid mixture.246 In 2012, 
Congress introduced another piece of legislation entitled the “Fracturing 
Regulations are Effective in State Hands” (“FRESH”) Act, which 
proposed that all regulatory authority over fracking should be left to the 
states.247 However, neither piece of legislation was reported out-of-
committee.248 Congress either chose to continue its disregard for 
establishing some form of hydraulic fracturing legislation, or it was 
awaiting guidance from an EPA study on the potential effects of hydraulic 
fracturing on water resources.  
The 2015 Draft Assessment of the EPA study249 cited several instances 
in which fluid migration occurred and was caused by hydraulic injections, 
and it concluded that the evidence shows drinking water resources might 
have been impacted by hydraulic fracturing fluids escaping the wellbore 
and surrounding formations in certain areas.250 The study confirmed that 
water contamination occurred through spills of hydraulic fracturing fluid, 
discharge of treated hydraulic fracturing wastewater, underground 
migration of fluids and gas, and direct injection.251 The study found that 
occurrences of drinking water impacts are minimal relative to the number 
of hydraulically fractured wells.252 This result might imply that drinking 
water impacts by fracking operations are rare or that the results might be 
understated because of “insufficient pre- and post-hydraulic fracturing 
data on the quality of drinking water resources.”253 Presumably, the EPA’s 
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study will not aid Congress in a determination of how to proceed with 
regulations, and Congress will continue to leave regulation up to the 
states.254 The study’s findings on the effects of hydraulic fracturing remain 
inconclusive because of the same lack of information impacting potential 
plaintiffs. 
V. A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS CONTAMINATION CONCERNS 
Although the detrimental effects of hydraulic fracturing remain 
unclear, the process is beneficial in a number of ways.255 With this in mind, 
any proposed strategy should not act as a roadblock to the shale boom, but 
rather should facilitate its continuance while incentivizing innovation, 
information gathering, and operating under best practices. Baseline water 
testing and chemical disclosures are both regulations that will further the 
knowledge of the industry’s practices while furthering the industry itself. 
Innovation and advancing technology require a substantial data set as a 
prerequisite. Thus, all regulations applied to the industry should further 
the acquisition of data. However, hydraulic fracturing provides a difficult 
set of circumstances to determine whether ex post or ex ante schemes 
would be more beneficial, given the lack of conclusive findings.  
A. Ex Post Regulation 
Tort liability is an ex post regulatory strategy because it imposes 
monetary sanctions on parties causing injury after the injury occurred and 
the cause has been determined.256 The policy benefits of imposing liability 
on hydraulic fracturing operations are two-fold. First, the companies are 
incentivized to reduce harm by implementing new innovations, high safety 
standards, and self-regulation.257 Second, parties who suffer harm will be 
compensated if they can establish the required elements.258 This form of 
regulation is beneficial when the activity being regulated is not very well 
understood or is very complex, thus rendering the drafting of an all-
encompassing set of regulations impractical. However, ex post liability does 
not always grant equitable relief in hydraulic fracturing cases.259 
Additionally, tort liability as a regulatory strategy might make operators’ 
predictions of costs in their risk analysis difficult because of the uncertainty 
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involved with jury decisions, which often leads to inefficiencies associated 
with under- or over-deterrence.260 When one regulatory strategy cannot 
fulfill its goals, a blended strategy of tort liability and best-practice 
regulation might be beneficial.261 
B. Ex Ante Regulation 
Ex ante regulation attempts to reduce the risk of harm before its 
occurrence through several methods, including establishing best-practice 
standards.262 Best-practice regulations encourage industries to develop 
standard practices that provide a safe, efficient, and economical method of 
operation.263 When these regulations are enforced efficiently, industries 
benefit by having predictable regulatory costs and standards to follow, as 
opposed to unpredictable settlement costs and jury awards.264 Additionally, 
applying a regulatory standard provides reassurance to the public, which 
may prove beneficial to the hydraulic fracturing industry given the bitter 
debate, much of which may be attributed to the lack of regulation.265 
Implementing standard methods in the industry will also further the 
information assimilation and understanding of hydraulic fracturing. 
When industries perform similar tasks in a similar fashion, it facilitates 
the gathering of data in a more expedient and reliable way. When the 
number of variables is reduced and the amount of data is increased, the 
study of fracking will produce more conclusive results, thus culminating 
in answers to important unanswered questions. Hydraulic fracturing has 
provided tremendous beneficial impacts to Louisiana with a negligible 
amount of currently known harm.266 Any regulations implemented should 
take this factor into account to prevent overregulation or stifling of the 
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industry.267 The regulations should advance the industry while incentivizing 
the assimilation of information and innovation. 
1. Baseline Testing 
Currently, Louisiana does not require fracking operators to perform 
water testing before commencing operations. Incorporating a baseline 
water-testing requirement into Louisiana’s regulatory strategy is imperative 
to the long-term betterment of the hydraulic fracturing industry. Baseline 
water testing provides a benchmark for the water composition before 
commencing drilling operations.268 Once fracking has begun, or ceased, and 
contamination has been alleged, the water can be retested to determine any 
changes in the water’s composition. If contaminants are found in the second 
sample that were not present in the first and the contaminant is an oil- and 
gas-production-related chemical, an allegation of contamination would 
likely be supported. The baseline water testing data would benefit the 
landowner by supplementing his or her case with evidence of causation that 
is typically lacking.269 By contrast, if the second water test revealed that 
the contaminant was not a chemical related to the hydraulic fracturing 
process or that the water had not been contaminated, the operator would 
be able to use this evidence to prove that its operations did not contaminate 
the water. If a presumption of liability were enforced in these cases, the 
operator would have to prove that his operations did not cause the 
contamination or that a third party’s operations did. In either case, the 
plaintiff would likely obtain an equitable remedy, as long as the 
contamination occurred within the required radius and time frame.  
Members of the hydraulic fracturing production community often 
claim that hydraulic fracturing has never been proven to be the cause of 
groundwater contamination.270 Baseline testing gives the industry an 
opportunity to prove how small the risk of contamination is while 
accumulating data that may facilitate innovation. Additionally, numerous 
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studies seeking to determine the effects of hydraulic fracturing on 
groundwater have found contaminants, such as methane, in drinking water 
wells from natural occurrences.271 Having baseline water data gives operators 
the data necessary to prove that they are not the source of contamination to 
not only plaintiffs, but also to the public in general. 
The cost of sampling and testing is a deterrent for requiring operators to 
perform baseline testing. The states with these requirements in place have 
attempted to reduce the cost burden by limiting the number of water sources 
that an operator would have to sample and permitting the use of sampling 
done for nearby wells, that is, if they were performed in the time frame 
permitted.272 In Wyoming, the average cost of sampling is between $680 and 
$1,090 per sample—testing the four wells the law requires, including the 
initial sampling and analyses, would cost approximately $5,800, if isotopic 
testing of the methane is not required.273 If the sampling is done both before 
and after fracturing, the total cost would be an estimated $11,600.274 In 
comparison, the average cost of drilling and completing a well in the popular 
Haynesville Shale formation located in Louisiana is $9.95 million.275 At first 
glance, baseline testing might seem expensive, but when considered as a 
relative cost of drilling and completing a well in Louisiana, the cost would be 
just over 0.1% of the total cost of drilling and completing a well. This cost is 
entirely reasonable considering the benefits provided. 
At the federal level, the Department of the Interior recently removed the 
requirement that operators perform baseline water testing from its proposed 
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rules governing hydraulic fracturing on federal lands.276 The Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM”) agrees with the commentators—acquiring baseline 
water data is a good policy, a best practice, and is beneficial to all parties.277 
Although BLM encourages baseline testing, it will not require the testing on 
a national level for two reasons. First, the hydrogeological conditions vary 
significantly across the nation, and establishing a single comprehensive rule 
to cover all such conditions would be difficult.278 Second, in many instances, 
BLM does not manage the surface above the leased minerals.279 However, 
BLM recommends that if water quality impacts are anticipated, baseline 
testing may be implemented with requirements developed on a case-by-case 
basis.280 Thus the federal government has again left the requirement of best 
practices to local authorities, who are better informed of the states’ specific 
conditions and variables.  
Louisiana should require baseline testing as a preventative measure to 
increase the likelihood of early detection and promote innovation, while 
simultaneously protecting its landowners and resources. The state has 
regretted taking a lackadaisical approach to hazardous material regulation in 
the past281 and will find itself in a similar situation if preventative actions are 
not taken.  
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If baseline water testing is required and over time the data proves that 
contamination is not occurring as a result of hydraulic fracturing, Louisiana 
will benefit by removing the burden of enforcing the unnecessary regulation 
of a safe industry. Conversely, if the data shows that groundwater 
contamination is occurring, early detection will allow Louisiana to determine 
the additional regulatory or statutory restrictions required to protect its 
underground water supply. If Louisiana is constantly acquiring data, evidence 
of a systemic problem will be known years in advance compared to the 
timeline of Louisiana beginning data acquisition as problems arise. 
Additionally, the data might evidence that certain formations or regions are 
more susceptible to drinking water impacts by hydraulic fracturing. If that 
happens, the state may apply more rigid regulations in those locations to 
combat the increased risk of contamination. 
2. Best Practices 
Over time, as a comprehensive data set is established, best-practices 
regulations should be enacted for those aspects of hydraulic fracturing 
operations that become well-understood with established methods. For areas 
that remain dubious or are lacking in data, Louisiana should establish required 
testing, similar to baseline water testing, by in-state operators to gather the 
data. If the proposed measures are in place and injury occurs, the injured 
parties must seek equitable relief through liability claims. The injured parties 
will be in a better position because they will have the baseline water data, 
which will provide the means to prove causation. As the number of fracking 
operations continues to increase, the amount of data regarding its effects will 
also increase, and the industry will become standardized. This data will further 
the understanding of the effects of fracking while providing operators and 
injured parties the data necessary either to prove or disprove the element of 
causation.282 
Data accumulated over a number of years could show helpful trends in 
the locations and level of any contamination. These trends can then be 
evaluated to determine which methods and materials are more prone to 
causing injury and in what geologic formations the injury is most likely to 
occur. This information will allow the industry to adjust its operations 
accordingly to avoid litigation based on methods and conditions found to be 
more at risk for contamination. State regulators may also evaluate the data to 
determine whether further regulation is required in certain areas or for certain 
operations, or whether imposed regulations are unnecessary and should be 
removed. As the information develops, certain practices will be found to be 
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the safest and most effective. These practices should become the best-
practices standard. The best-practice standards should provide methods an 
operator can follow that are proven safe and effective and require minimum 
regulation. 
For an evolving and growing industry such as hydraulic fracturing 
production, regulations should promote research and development of the 
industry while protecting Louisiana’s finite resources. Hydraulic fracturing 
has provided significant benefits with minimal known injuries; therefore, 
Louisiana’s movement toward practical and efficient steps to protect the 
industry is important. 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana is in the midst of a manufacturing renaissance283 that is 
pumping billions of dollars into its economy,284 the essence of which is 
hydraulically fractured natural gas. As the growth of the industry continues, 
hydraulic fracturing will be performed on an expanding scale with an 
increasing number of operators. Louisiana must take steps to promote safe 
hydraulic fracturing and data acquisition while the long-term effects of 
hydraulic fracturing are determined. Initially, the state should impose required 
baseline water testing prior to any hydraulic fracturing activity. If Louisiana 
waits until widespread contamination occurs it will be too late, because the 
time frame for contamination may be decades. As the industry becomes better 
understood, the state may choose to increase or reduce regulations 
accordingly. Ideally, the data will prove that contamination is rare. However, 
until conclusive determinations can be made on the long-term effects of 
widespread hydraulic fracturing use, Louisiana must require operators to 
acquire the data necessary to protect landowners, natural resources, and the 
industry itself. 
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